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Specificities and Limits of
Taiwanese Nationalism
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
1 Taiwanese nationalism is, in many ways, specific. On the one hand it is a recognised
phenomenon. On the other, as the product of a young state, the Republic of China in
Taiwan, which is  threatened by the People's  Republic of  China,  and isolated on the
diplomatic  level,  this  nationalism  is  controversial.  It  is  sufficiently  powerful  to  be
perceived as an important factor in the evolution of Formosa and of its relations with
the  Chinese  mainland,  but  not  enough  to  avoid  being  the  object  of  deliberate
promotion by some of  the island's  political  players,  particularly the government of
Chen  Shui-bian.  Complex,  plural and  essentially  Han,  Taiwanese  society  remains
divided  about  its  future,  particularly  when  faced  with  the  prospect  of  the  island's
independence, which is to say of a definitive break with China. The opposition of the
People's Republic and of a large part of the international community to independence
accentuates these divisions. Moreover, since 1987, Taiwan has established ever closer
economic and human ties with precisely the country which denies it any sovereignty.
The  nationalism  forged  by  the  Taiwanese  state  cannot  ignore  these  external
constraints.  While  the verbal  and military threats  from Peking have contributed to
reinforcing  this  nationalism,  its  nature,  its  limitations  and  its  future  are  open  to
question1.
2 Taiwanese nationalism today constitutes an unavoidable reality. At the same time, it is
in many ways specific. Built on a state—the Republic of China (ROC), a regime founded
by Sun Yat-sen in Nanking in 1927, and which took refuge in Taiwan in 1949—stemming
directly from the Chinese nation,  this  nationalism is  still  founded on an “imagined
community”2 which is relatively recent (fewer than sixty years have gone by, and fewer
than twenty since the beginning of the democratisation of the island), and which is
contested and claimed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), and therefore isolated
on the diplomatic level.
3 A nationalist current has long existed in Taiwan that one could call fundamentalist,
which favours pure and simple independence and is convinced that Taiwanese culture
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does not belong to Chinese culture. However, for reasons which are both internal and
international, it has little hope of winning the support of a majority of Taiwanese. On
the other hand, the identification, beginning in 1949, of the Republic of China with
Taiwan has favoured the emergence of a Taiwanese national consciousness that the
democratisation of the island, beginning in 1986, has consolidated. In other words, and
in confirmation of the thesis of Gellner or of Hobsbawm3, the state of the Republic of
China, by default Taiwan after 1949, is the main ferment of Taiwanese nationalism. To
such an extent that, steeped as it still is in Chinese culture, the island's society has built
a Taiwanese cultural identity and political identity that Peking's intransigence on the
question of Chinese sovereignty has contributed to reinforcing. Thus the majority of
Taiwanese are now “sovereignists” in the sense that after fifty years of nation-building
—initially  imposed  and  then  desired—they  feel  that  only  the  Republic  of  China  in
Taiwan—and not the People's Republic—can represent them both internally and on the
international  scene.  Taiwanese  nationalism  centres—and  has  thus  built  and  rebuilt
itself—on this complex reality which makes it more particular, moderate and plural
than ambiguous—is  any nationalism devoid of  ambiguity  and contradictions?—,  but
allows  it  to  remain  open  to  a  compromise  with  Chinese  nationalism,  if  the  latter
manages  to  take  its  existence  into  account,  and  to  make  a  place  for  it  within  the
Chinese nation4. If the opposite proved to be the case, Taiwanese nationalism could to a
certain extent become more radical and become a further obstacle to building peace in
the Strait of Formosa.
Taiwanese nationalism: roots that were geographical before becoming historical
4 The  roots  of  Taiwanese  nationalism  were  geographical  before  becoming  historical.
Taiwan's insularity explains a number of historical developments that have taken place
since  this  land,  which  lies  150  kilometres  off  the  coast  of  Fujian,  and  was  mainly
peopled by Austronesians (in 1600 they numbered fifty thousand on the plains and
probably  another  fifty  thousand  in  the  mountains,  as  against  about  twenty-five
thousand  Chinese)  was  colonised,  first  by  the  Dutch  (1624-1661)  and  the  Spanish
(1626-1642), and then by the Chinese. It was in fact Taiwan's insularity which allowed
General Koxinga (Zhen Chenggong), who was loyal to the Ming dynasty, to establish
and maintain there, for over twenty years, a Chinese regime opposed to the Manchus
(1661-1683)5.  It  was  also  its  insularity  which  contributed to  the  transformation  of
Taiwan,  after  being conquered and annexed by the Manchu Empire in  1683,  into a
“frontier region”.  In fact,  Peking administered only the western plains—leaving the
aborigines  in  the  mountains  in  de  facto  independence—and  closely  supervised  the
increase in the Han population (which from 130,000 in 1684 had risen to 2.5 million by
1893),  in  order  to  limit  conflict  with  the  Austronesian  peoples.  Also,  lying  at  the
intersection of international sea trade routes, Taiwan, by the mid-nineteenth century,
aroused the covetousness of the Great Powers of the time, in particular of Great Britain,
of  France  (whose  Courbet  expedition  failed  in  1884-1885)  and  of  Japan,  which  saw
Taiwan as the “natural” extension of the Ryukyu Archipelago. It was also these designs
which incited the Manchu court (including Li Hongzhang) to modernise the island, to
reinforce its security, and to raise it to the rank of a province in 1885, before having to
cede it  to  the Japanese Empire ten years  later.  Finally,  in  1949,  having for  a  while
considered taking refuge on the island of Hainan, Chiang decided to transfer his regime
provisionally to Taiwan because its insularity, its distance from the mainland, and the
military  defences  built  by  the  Japanese  protected him much better  than any other
geographical  or  military frontier  from Mao's  essentially  land-based forces.  In other
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words, Taiwan's insularity is the direct cause of the co-existence for over half a century
of two rival Chinese political regimes.
5 But insularity has also favoured in Taiwan, even when it was under the power of the
Chinese  mainland  (before  1895  and  between  1945  and  1949),  the  formation  of  a
sociocultural sense of identity, which, despite the demographic hegemony of the Han,
has  always  been  deeper  than  in  the  country's  other  Han  provinces.  This  sense  of
identity was fed by Chinese immigration, mainly from Fujian, a landlocked province
which has always tended to turn away from the imperial capital6.
6 The second characteristic of Taiwanese nationalism is that it has been much more fed
by  the  opposition  between  the  mainlanders  who  arrived  with  Chiang  in  1945-1949
(waishengren, about 13% of the population today) and native Taiwanese (benshengren,
87%), than by the desire to separate from the Chinese nation. When, under the terms of
the  treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  Taiwan  came  under  Japanese  domination  in  1895,  the
island's population tried to resist this occupation. For example, a number of Manchu
mandarins  and local  notables  decided then to  found a  Republic  of  Taiwan (Taiwan
minzhuguo).  However, despite what certain Taiwanese nationalists assert today, the
aim of this initiative was not to establish some sort of independence for the island. It
was part of a project to return Taiwan to the Chinese Empire, which was invited to
maintain its suzerainty and its protection of the territory, which had been momentarily
lost7. A sizeable portion of the Taiwanese opposition to Japanese colonisation continued
to  pursue  this objective,  while  another  more  realistic  and  more  influential  group
(represented  in  particular  by  Li  Hsien-tang)  concentrated  its  demands  on  the
establishment  of  political  autonomy  within  the  Japanese  empire.  But  the  policy  of
forcible assimilation adopted by Tokyo in 1936, shortly before the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese war, destroyed these hopes, and developed in Taiwan a resentment against a
particularly repressive occupier, which goes much deeper than Taiwanese nationalists
will  admit today8.  This was the reason why, in 1945,  Chiang Kai-shek's troups were
welcomed as liberators by the Taiwanese.
7 It is true that this perception did not last long. The incompetence and corruption of the
new administrators,  their  distrust  of  a  population whose degree of  “nipponisation”
they  overestimated9,  and  then  the  repression  which  followed  the  local  revolt  on
February  28th  1947  permanently  destroyed  the  Taiwanese  dream  of  a  harmonious
return to the Chinese nation.  February 28th also produced a two-fold phenomenon
which was to prove lasting: on the one hand, a feeling of nostalgia for the Japanese
period, whose colonisation, uncompromising though it was, is nowadays described by
Taiwanese  nationalists,  if  not  as  a  golden  age,  at  least  as  an  era  of  economic  and
institutional modernisation, and even of emerging local democracy (between 1919 and
1936); and on the other hand, the affirmation of a Taiwanese consciousness (Taiwan
yishi) and a Taiwanese identity (Taiwan rentong) based on a specific historical path, as
well  as a demand for autonomy and democracy on the part of the Taiwanese elites
which has gradually given birth to a genuine independence movement10.
8  For, in 1945 or 1947, continuing a demand which had been put forward during the
Japanese  occupation,  the  great  majority  of  these  elites  were  not  calling  for
independence but a certain form of autonomy11. It is true that after February 28th, a
few  activists,  such  as  Liao  Bun-gei  (or  Thomas  Liao  Wen-yi),  called  on  the  United
Nations  to  establish  a  Mandate  or  Trusteeship  in  Taiwan,  in  order  to  allow  the
population  to  decide  by  referendum  what  the  final  status  of  the  island  would  be
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(independence or belonging to the PRC). This trend was very much in a minority, and
soon went into exile in Japan12. In the repressive context after February 28th, which
was also marked by the civil war on the mainland and the preparations for the transfer
of the nationalist government to Taiwan, the majority of the elites could not really
conceive of any demands for independence.
9 In other words, much more than Japanese colonisation, it was the lasting separation of
China into two distinct states which formed the basis for the Taiwanese independence
movement and made it possible for Taiwanese consciousness and identity to change
into nationalism. Consequently, the geographical and historic specificities of Taiwanese
nationalism have not in any way weakened what is now the classic thesis of Gellner or
Hobsbawm, according to which the state  precedes the nation:  Taiwan constitutes  a
perfect, though obviously specific, illustration of this thesis13.
10 In 1950, the conversion of the United States to a One-China policy slowed the growth of
this  movement.  The  hesitation  of  President  Truman,  who  was  tempted,  after  the
outbreak of the Korean War (in June 1950), to reactivate the idea which had been put
aside  since  the  Cairo  Conference  of  making  Taiwan  a  United  Nations  trusteeship,
probably kept alive for a while the hopes of the small independence movement which,
as we have seen, was already in exile in Japan. This American position was, however,
dictated more by the strategy of containment of communism in Asia than by any desire
to  call  into  question  past  commitments14.  From  1953,  Eisenhower  gave  unqualified
support  to  Chiang  and  his  ROC  in  exile,  contributing  to  the  maintenance  of  an
international  standing  which  was  out  of  proportion  to  its  real  power  (including  a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council). The Two Chinas policy that Washington
sought to formalise during the 1960s, in particular after the recognition of the Peking
government by Paris in 1964, was merely a short-lived episode, even though it found a
favourable echo in the ranks of the Taiwanese opposition, known as dangwai (non-
Party).
11 Moreover it was in 1964 that the Director of the Political Science Department of the
National  University  of  Taiwan,  Peng  Min-min,  was  arrested  for  having  criticised
Chiang's plans to reconquer the mainland, called for the democratisation of Taiwan and
denied that the island was part of China, proposing the peaceful co-existence of two
states on the world stage and within the United Nations15. In thrall to the old ROC, and
believing,  wrongly,  that  the  Peking  regime  was  on  the brink  of  collapse,  Chiang
remained opposed to any “Two Chinas” policy. This obstinacy led to a faster adjustment
of American policy. From 1971, obsessed by the Soviet threat, the United States, on
Kissinger and Nixon's initiative, definitively abandoned any vague desire to have the
existence  of  two  Chinese  states  officially  ratified  by  the  international  community,
formally maintaining a single China policy which went against Chiang (the replacement
of the “Chiang Kai-shek clique” by the regime in Peking at the UN in 1971, the joint
Chinese-American Declaration of Shanghai in 1972).  Apparently satisfying both Mao
and Chiang, this change prefigured the normalisation of Chinese-American relations in
1979, and set out the foundations of a China policy from which the United States has
not deviated since.
12 These events had two main consequences: on the one hand, they increased opposition
pressure  for  the  democratisation  of  the  Taiwanese  regime;  on  the  other  they
strengthened Taiwanese  nationalism and in  particular  its  independence  movement.
The expulsion of  the ROC from the UN followed by “de-recognition” by the United
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States discredited the KMT's single-China policy. Reduced to the rank of a “non-state”
16, how could the ROC continue to claim that it represented the Chinese nation? And,
conversely, how could the PRC claim to represent Taiwan on the international scene?
Democratisation, diplomatic isolation and Taiwanese nationalism
13 By 1972,  a  process  of  Taiwanisation of  the  administration and of  cautious  political
liberalisation was  begun by Chiang Ching-kuo,  son of  Chiang Kai-shek (deceased in
1975),  who  had  become  Prime  Minister.  But  this  evolution  quickly  favoured  the
growing  strength  of  a  Taiwanese  identity  movement  which  was  both  cultural
(particularly literary) and political,  and whose best-known vector was the magazine
Meilidao  (Formosa)17.  Using  as  its  title  the  Western  or  “pre-Chinese”  name for  the
island,  this  publication  symbolised  the  merging  of  demands  for  democracy  and
demands for self-determination. The banning of Meilidao and the arrest of its prime
movers in December 1979, in the context of the increasing diplomatic isolation of the
ROC, helped to reinforce this merger, whose political manifestation was the creation in
1986 of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) the main opposition party to the KMT18.
14 The  year  1986  is  thus  a  turning  point  in  the  political  history  of  Taiwan  and  of
Taiwanese nationalism. For the first time, Chiang Ching-kuo decided to tolerate the
establishment  of  a  party  led  by  native  Taiwanese  and  which  promoted  Taiwanese
consciousness and identity, if not overtly the independence of Taiwan. This decision
was part of a strategic change of direction in the KMT, the two main pillars of which
were closely connected: on the one hand the suspension of martial law (in July 1987)
and the gradual democratisation of institutions (beginning in 1991); on the other, the
opening of  indirect  trade and human links  (via  Hong Kong)  with the PRC (autumn
1987). Without recognising the Peking regime, Chiang took account of a reality which
led  ipso  facto  to  an  assumed  political  identification  (without  however  being  legal)
between  the  ROC  and  Taiwan,  or  more  precisely  the  territories  placed  under  the
jurisdiction  (WW  guanxia)  of  Taipei:  Taiwan,  the  Pescadores,  Kinmen  and  Matsu19.
Completed by Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in
January 1988, this fundamental change unleashed Taiwanese nationalism and desire for
independence,  but  also  channelled  it  through  the  democratic  contest,  which
highlighted its ambiguities and limitations.
15 Since  its  foundation  the  DPP  has  been  divided  by  divergent  trends  and  the
independence faction, which is to say those whose priority was a clear and definitive
break between the Chinese nation and the Taiwanese nation, were in a minority. The
main stake at the time was the democratisation and therefore the Taiwanisation of the
political system. It is true that the events of Tiananmen on the mainland, the political
reforms  introduced  by  Lee  Teng-hui  beginning  in  1991,  the  establishment  of  an
unofficial channel of communication between Taipei and Peking and the adoption by
the KMT government of a long-term programme for the reunification of China, were all
factors which contributed to strengthening the cause of independence. Thus in 1991, in
response to requests from Chen Shui-bian and others, the DPP added to its statutes the
famous clause in favour of the self-determination of Taiwan, which proposed to make it
obligatory for  the island's  leaders  to  submit  any decision concerning the definitive
status  of  the island to  the approval  of  the population20.  However,  the more clearly
independence-minded  line  adopted  by  the  DPP  at  the  time  cost  it  votes,  which
prompted it to quickly moderate its discourse. Thus by 1995, the DPP, which was then
presided by Shih Ming-teh,  decided to  settle  for  the status  quo,  and,  like  the KMT
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(including the New Party, a dissident formation of the KMT), based its international
campaign on the improvement of Taiwan's diplomatic status and particularly its return
to the UN. 
16 In other words, the democratisation of Taiwan created a new consensus, which one
might  call  “sovereignist”,  between  the  Taiwanised  KMT  and  the  DPP:  the  “ROC  in
Taiwan” is a sovereign state whose future can only be determined by the Taiwanese
themselves. While it does not rule out a priori any future unification with a democratic
China, this new consensus gives priority to the development, security and survival of
the island as a Nation state that is already independent, and to the consolidation of its
democracy. From now on, despite the rivalries which divide them, all the Taiwanese
political parties have to take into account and integrate this new consensus along with
the “civic” nationalism it has produced21.
The consolidation of Taiwanese nationalism since the 1990s
17 Since the 1990s, Taiwanese nationalism has affirmed itself clearly. This increased power
is  the result  not  only of  democratisation but of  a  dialectic  process  where the local
political forces which promote it have been reinforced by the PRC's hostility towards it.
The result has been a certain radicalisation, of a nativist — which is to say seeking to
favour the promotion of native Taiwanese at the expense of their fellow countrymen of
mainland origin — not to say fundamentalist nature.
The increasing power of Taiwanese political and cultural identity
18 The affirmation of Taiwanese identity is a recognised phenomenon. While the opinion
polls can give varying results, they all highlight the same trend: the majority of citizens
in  the  ROC  today  consider  themselves  to  be  Taiwanese  (between  45%  and  50%
depending on the source, as against 14% in 1992), or at least Taiwanese and Chinese
(between 39% and 41% as against 33%), but only rarely Chinese (between 8% and 11% as
against 49%)22. According to some sources close to the DPP, at the end of 2004, close to
two-thirds of Taiwanese (61%) favoured the first choice, only 16% the second and 14%
the third23.
19 This undeniable change covers a gradual metamorphosis in the political, and also to
some extent the cultural identity of the Taiwanese. Favoured by the rehabilitation of
Taiwanese culture which had long been repressed by the minority from the mainland
which dominated the island between 1949 and 1987, this transformation has mainly
made possible an increase in the power of the minnan community (also called Hoklo,
70% of the population) and of its dialect, which by the end of the 1990s was promoted to
the rank of second official language of the island. It has also given rise to a greater
taking into account of the diversity of human groups in Taiwan and of the languages
they  speak,  in  particular  Hakka  spoken  by  15%  of  the  population)  and  the  main
Austronesian dialects (atayal, tsou, ami, paiwanic, etc.).  Thus has been constituted a
discourse that is both universalist (democracy and economic globalisation) and nativist
(Taiwanese),and which has gradually become the dominant discourse of the political
class  (including  Lee  Teng-hui's  Taiwanised  KMT),  calling  for  recognition  both  of
Taiwan's  status  as  a  state  under  international  law and  of  a  historical  and  cultural
specificity which differentiates it from the PRC24. In 1997, the revision of school books
and the introduction of the teaching of Taiwanese history, conceived separately from
the study of Chinese history, was one of the outcomes of this change25. A year later, in
the autumn of 1998, seeking to bring together the various communities on the island,
and in particular to favour the election of the KMT candidate of mainland origin Ma
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Ying-jeou to the mayoralty of Taipei, against the incumbent mayor Chen Shui-bian, Lee
Teng-hui  launched  the  concept  of  the  “New  Taiwanese”  (xin  Taiwanren/sin
Taiwanlang).  Through  this  unifying  slogan,  Lee  also  sought  to  consolidate  the
sovereignist consensus referred to above.
20 Nonetheless,  this  discourse shows the extent to which Taiwanese identity has been
constructed not by itself,  in  a  somehow essentialist  manner,  but  in reaction to the
traditional approach to Chinese culture and history developed by the KMT (up to the
1990s) and by the Communist Party, as well as to Chinese nationalism and thus to the
irredentist claims of Peking. Aimed at countering the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, the
intensification of the psychological and military pressure from the People's Republic—
particularly during the missile crisis of 1995-1996 and the mini-crisis of 1999 provoked
by Peking with the aim of stigmatising Lee Teng-hui's “two nations theory”, as well as
the threatening official report in February 2000—has on the contrary stirred it up.
21 Prior to 1995, the KMT government still sought to reconcile the principle, admittedly
revised, of a single China with the rise of Taiwanese identity. For example, the “Official
report on the relations between the two shores of the Strait” in 1994 declared that
Taiwan henceforth constituted not a country but a political entity (zhengzhi shiti), a
“community of life” (shenghuo gongtongti), a Gemeinschaft, whose future—unification
with China or definitive separation—depended mainly on the attitude of Peking. But in
July 1999, China's economic and political emergence and its determination to win over
the United States to its cause, prompted Lee Teng-hui to take a further and probably
decisive  step.  As  he  saw it  Taiwan (ROC)  constituted  a  separate  country  from (the
People's  Republic  of)  China  and  their  relations  could  only  be  “particular  relations
between one State and another” (tesu de guo yu guo de guanxi). This new description
shocked Peking and prompted it in February 2000 to raise any procrastination sine die
by Taiwan of the negotiations on reunification into a casus belli. Washington judged
Lee to be responsible for this new crisis. Nonetheless, over 70% of Taiwanese gave their
president  approval,  thus  confirming and consolidating the  new consensus  that  had
appeared in Taiwan during the 1990s. Moreover, this progression of Taiwanese identity
affected all the island's communities, including the mainlanders, in particular those of
the second or third generation,  all  of  whom were born on the island and speak or
understand the Hoklo dialect. Already in 1997, 42.9% of the descendants of mainlanders
born between 1968  and 1981  declared themselves  to  be  Taiwanese,  as  against  only
27.6%  of  those  born  before  196826.  Finally,  Taiwanese  identity  was  increasingly
instrumentalised by the Taipei government in order to try to bring the country out of
its diplomatic isolation, both by looking for new diplomatic allies, particularly in Africa
and in  the South Pacific,  and by developing a  pragmatic  diplomacy—towards Asian
countries  which  had  official  relations  with  Peking—which  has  almost  constantly
enjoyed public support27.
22 In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that, conversely, 75% of Taiwanese are
opposed,  not  only  to  the  formula  favoured  by  Deng  Xiaoping  “one  country,  two
systems”,  but  to  any  reunification28.  While,  because  of  the  military  threat  of  the
People's Liberation Army (PLA), they are more favourable to the maintenance of the
status  quo  (around 60%)  than  to  formal  independence  for  the  island  (around 20%,
including 5 to 7% without delay),  they identify with a country which,  for historical
reasons and for a growing number of them by default, is called Republic of China but
which is in reality Taiwan29. Moreover, each time tensions in the Strait rise, supporters
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of the status quo increase while supporters of any reunification, even in the long term,
decrease. This is why, although the propaganda from Peking now seeks to “win the
hearts of the Taiwanese”, it has so far managed only to sharpen their political identity
and their nationalism.
23 In fact, the increase in economic and human ties between the two shores of the Strait
has not up to now succeeded in bringing the Chinese and Taiwanese identities closer
together.  Of  course,  favoured  by  the  economic  opening  up  and  the  very  relative
political liberalisation of the Peking regime, these relations have made possible better
mutual knowledge and, by forging ever closer interdependent links, have contributed
to increasing the cost of any military conflict, first for Taiwan but also for the People's
Republic  of  China.  Moreover,  sensitive  to  the  political  environment  in  which  they
operate, about two-thirds of the Taiwanese businessmen (or Taishang) resident on the
mainland (who number over a million today) feel closer to the Blue Camp (the KMT and
the People First Party (PFP) or Quinmindang) than to the Green Camp (the DPP and the
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) or Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng)30. Nonetheless, as mostly
native Taiwanese, who speak the Hokkien dialect among themselves, the Taishang as a
whole continue to identify with Taiwan, forming a community on the mainland which
shares most of the characteristics of other “expatriate” communities31. In the search
for their roots, the Taiwanese of mainland origin are more likely to try to reintegrate
with mainland society. However, this desire is often frustrating and rarely complete, so
Taiwanised is this community today, and thus incited—by both their compatriots and
the  Chinese  authorities—to  remain  united  with  the  other  Taishang.  Moreover,  the
many Taiwanese tourists  who visit  China today generally come back with a clearer
sense of their own “Taiwanicity”, which is to say of their identification with the Nation-
state to which they belong.
24 Finally,  while  over three million visits  by Taiwanese are counted every year in the
People's Republic, about two-thirds of the island's inhabitants have never been there. It
is often the same Taishang (or the same tourists from the island) who make the return
journey  several  times  a  year.  But  probably  because  of  this  growing  economic  and
human integration with the mainland, since the election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000,
Taiwanese  nationalism  has  taken  on  a  more  nativist  form,  which  one  might  call
fundamentalist,  and  which  paradoxically  has  highlighted  the  ambiguities  and
limitations of this phenomenon.
Taiwanese nationalism's fundamentalist temptation: the “de-sinisation” of the island
25 As we have seen, there has existed in Taiwan since 1945 an independence movement
which bases its demands on an identity which is not only political but also cultural and
ethnic  and  completely  different  from  the  Chinese  identity;  this  is  what  I  call  the
fundamentalist  trend. Formerly represented by Shih Min who believed that the 400
years of  Taiwanese history were those of  a  people who,  by crossing the strait,  had
sought  to  free  themselves  from  the  Chinese  yoke32,  this  movement  seeks  to
demonstrate  that  Taiwanese  cultural  habits  are  not  part  of  the  Chinese  (or  Han)
cultural sphere,  and believes that because of the widespread interbreeding between
Austronesians and Chinese immigrants, the Taiwanese ethnic group (Taiwan minzu) is
racially different from the Han. While it is very much in a minority within the DPP, it is
much more influential within Lee Teng-hui's TSU, which spreads its ideas. These are
also fairly widespread in pro-Taiwan organisations in the United States and in Japan33.
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26 Nonetheless, in order to win the support of the independence movement, to politically
isolate an opposition which was tempted, after its historic defeat in March 2000, by the
“resinisation” of its discourse, and in order to affirm Taiwan's specificity abroad, Chen
Shui-bian has sought to instrumentalise the pressure from this movement. It is thus
that his government implemented a cultural and educational “de-sinisation” policy of a
much  more  systematic  nature  than  that  of  his  predecessor,  substituting  a highly
voluntarist  “Taiwano-centric”  policy34.  Any  cultural  event  deemed  to  be  typically
Taiwanese is now encouraged (including financially) and presented as such, at the risk
of giving too much importance to the Austronesian cultures, while everything which
could on the contrary maintain a connection with China is relegated to the background.
Taiwan's unofficial embassies abroad have been put in charge of spreading this new
tropism35.  Similarly,  the authorities  in  Taipei  have pursued their  revision of  school
curricula, introducing in 2001 in high schools a very controversial teaching of history
which  gives  greater  importance  to  the  study  of  Taiwan  after  1500  (aimed  at
foregrounding  its  Austronesian  identity  and  the  Dutch  colonisation),  and  then
announcing in 2004 the establishment of three new pillars for the spreading of this
discipline: Taiwan, Asia (including China), and the rest of the world.
27 Moreover  Chen  Shui-bian's  government  has  attempted—so  far  unsuccessfully—to
rewrite  the  content  of  this  teaching.  However  in  2004  he  asked  state-financed
organisations (such as the Foundation for Taiwanese Democracy whose director is the
deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Michael Kao Ying-mao) to propagate the idea that
the return of Taiwan to China in 1945 was a decision taken by the United States, and
imposed on the islanders by General Mac Arthur without their being consulted36. Also
in  June  2005,  he  introduced  on  the  Government  Information  website  a  history  of
Taiwan written by Huang Fu-san which elaborates an independence interpretation of
the island's Chinese past. Thus, Koxinga is presented as one of the distant fathers of the
Taiwanese  quest  for  independence37.  On  the  linguistic  level,  Chen  Shui-bian's
government has raised Hokkien or Minnan) to the status of a quasi-official language
and favoured the distribution of books in this vernacular dialect, although it is far from
possible to transcribe it completely in Chinese characters (not to mention the endless
debates on its range of romanisations)38.
28 Lastly, he has decided to promote a post-modern multiculturalism, no doubt imported
from California,  with the avowed aim of diluting the Chinese cultural  legacy into a
melting-pot  where  Japanese,  American  and  European  contributions  are  given  an
importance equal to the Chinese inheritance. After testing by Taiwan zhiku (Taiwan
Think Tank)39, a group close to the DPP, this multiculturalism was officially adopted by
the party in September 2004. It approved a “resolution on (sub)ethnic diversity and
national  unity”  which,  while  rejecting  on  principle  the  exclusion  of  any  group,
considers the mainlanders, the Hoklo and the Hakka, despite their being all Han, as
distinct “ethnic subgroups” (zuqun), in the same way as the Austronesians, the better
to bring them together within a “de-sinised” Taiwanese national identification and to
transform Taiwan into a “paradigm of multiculturalism”40.
29 More  generally,  however,  Chen  Shui-bian  and  the  DPP  have  made  this  nativist
nationalism the main theme of their politics, ostracising, in order to marginalise them,
those  mainlanders  who,  although  they  are  Taiwanised,  have  remained  influential
within  the  army,  academia  and  the  opposition  parties41.  The  foregrounding  of  the
Austronesian roots of the native Taiwanese has moreover given birth to a new form of
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snobbery, with politicians and island personalities claiming an aboriginal ancestor who
once  would  have  been shamefully  concealed.  The  Prime Minister  Hsieh  Chang-ting
went so far as to reveal to the public this new “good Taiwanese nationalist's certificate”
42. One can see here the dangerous distortions of a conception of the Taiwanese nation
which is moving further and further away from the inclusive notion of a “community
of  destiny”,  in  order  to  substitute  an  exclusive  definition  of  a  nation  based  on  a
particular racial blend.
30 However,  having  shown  its  effectiveness  during  the  presidential  election  in  March
200443, this nationalist policy reached its own limits in the subsequent general election
in December 2004. The new Parliament remained virtually identical to its predecessor,
giving once again the majority of the 225 seats to the Blue coalition (KMT: 79 seats, PFP:
34 seats) and keeping the Green camp in its previous position (DPP: 89 seats; TSU: 12
seats)44.
31 While there are many reasons for this result, one can consider that Chen also paid the
price in December 2004 of an excessively univocal and extreme promotion of Taiwanese
nationalism, shattering the consensus which had been forged during the 1990s around,
on the one hand the identification of the Republic of China with Taiwan, and on the
other, the maintenance of the status quo in the Strait45.
The limits and the plural character of Taiwanese nationalism
32 In fact, the propagation of nationalism and especially of Taiwanese nativism by the DPP
in government has contributed to intensifying the polarisation of island society. It has
also provoked an increase in  pressure from China and in American anxiety.  In  the
context of globalisation and of the economic integration between the two shores of the
Strait  of  Formosa,  it  especially  highlighted  the  schizophrenic  character  of  Chen's
policy, and hence the limits and plural character of Taiwanese nationalism.
33 It is clear that Taiwanese nationalism today constitutes an essential common value of
the political class as a whole: the need felt by the opposition candidates, the extremely
wealthy Lien Chan (KMT) and the mainlander James Soong Chu-yu (PFP) to kiss the soil
of Taiwan during the 2004 presidential campaign confirmed the unavoidable character
of the identity discourse summed up by the slogan “Love Taiwan”. However, the new
government's discourse revealed itself as much more exclusive than inclusive. First of
all it accentuated a feeling of crisis within the mainlander community who, although
Taiwanised, have trouble accepting the new cultural tropism of the Green Camp. Also,
this  discourse  contributed  to  the  reawakening  of  a  “provincial  origins  complex”
(shengji qingjie) which had gradually faded away after the process of democratisation
and maturing of the DPP, a party which had been too often tempted to exclude the
mainlanders.  While  the  cultural  activism  aimed  at  the  Hakka  community  was  well
received (and turned out to be very productive in electoral terms), it speeded up the
alienation  not  only  of  the  mainlanders,  whose  allegiance  to  Taiwan has  often,  and
generally  unjustly,  been  called  into  question,  but  of  the  many  Taishang  who,
established in the People's Republic, are increasingly worried by their government's
identitarian and “localist” isolation. The nativism of the island's present government
has led them to eclipse both the permanent hybridity of Taiwanese identity46 and the
process  of  economic  and  human  integration  with  the  mainland,  despite  having
recognised its reality in 2001.
34 Indeed, since 1999 a virtually constant number of people polled consider themselves to
be on the one hand Taiwanese, and on the other Taiwanese and Chinese (40% in 1999,
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and  45%  in  2004).  Also  several  surveys  show  that  young  Taiwanese  recognise
themselves in this dual identity more readily: 58% of the 25-35 age group, as against
37% of the “over 55” group, and 52% of the 36-55 age group in 2002. The same survey
showed that, conversely, 35% of the first group considered themselves to be Taiwanese
above all,  as against 44% in the second group, and 38% in the third47. Moreover the
question was phrased in such a way as to be able to refer either to political identity or
to  cultural  identity,  or  to  both.  As we  have  seen,  on  a  historical  level,  Taiwanese
nationalism is based much more on a state and therefore on a political identity that is
separate from the People's Republic, than on a cultural Taiwanicity whose outlines are
fluid,  shifting and controversial  within the island's community itself.  It  is  true that
according  to  several  surveys,  Taiwanese  cultural  nationalism  is  gaining  ground:
because of the long separation from the mainland and also probably because of the
Chen Shui-bian government's voluntarist policy, a majority of Taiwanese believe today
that  Chinese  and  Taiwanese  culture  are  different48.  Nonetheless,  polls  about  the
country's future also show that most Taiwanese would not for all that be opposed to a
formula which, while maintaining the ROC's sovereignty, would be combined with a
form of political union or integration (zhengzhi tonghe) with the People's Republic, as
had moreover been proposed by Chen in January 2001 and—as is too often forgotten—
by Lee Teng-hui in July 199949. What these surveys show in reality is that the majority
of  Taiwanese  favour  both  independence  and  unification,  depending  on  the
circumstances at the time and the conditions on offer50. Separatist discourse remains,
as  we  have  seen,  very  much in  a  minority.  In  other  words,  this  is  why Taiwanese
identity and nationalism are not synonymous with support for independence51.
35 In  such  circumstances  how  can  one  credit  the  idea  that  the  island's  three  Han
communities (98% of the population) no longer have any ties with Chinese culture, or
with  Confucian  ideology?  While Taiwanese  culture  developed  in  an  autonomous
manner, for example in relation to the minnan culture in Fujian, since the beginning of
the  Hoklo  migration  to  the  island,  is  it  possible  to  call  into  question  the  close
relationship between these two cultures,  and between them and the other facets of
Chinese  culture?  How  can  one  convince  native  Taiwanese  that  most  of  them  have
aboriginal  blood,  when  historical  research  has  demonstrated  that  while  there  was
intermingling,  the demographic  disparities  between the Han and the Austronesians
contradicted this assertion52? By giving such importance to blood relationships, are not
the Taiwanese nativists producing a mirror image of the Chinese communist approach
to  the  notion  of  “nationality”  (minzu),  and  are  they  not  perpetuating  the  most
traditional, and racist, interpretation of Han nationalism53?
36 There is little doubt that, by over-relying on these ideas, Chen and the Green camp
have contributed to weakening not only the internal political consensus but also the
vital strategic support provided by the United States to the de facto survival of the ROC.
It is a recognised fact that the political class as whole is favourable to the principle of a
referendum law or a far-reaching constitutional revision. But the untimely use by Chen
Shui-bian of the referendum law in March 2004—organising a plebiscite on the military
threat from the PLA in order to win more votes—was contested both by half of the
electorate and by the Bush administration, which is the American government most
favourable to Taiwan since 196854. Similarly, Chen had to transform his project for a
new  Constitution  into  a  plan  for  “regeneration”  of  the  basic  law,  in  order  not  to
infringe the diplomatic commitments made in May 2000,  and reaffirmed four years
later,  to  Washington  and  Peking55.  Lastly,  the  Chen  government's  hesitation  about
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increasing defence efforts, while the Chinese military threat grows steadily, as well as
the opposition of much of the Blue camp to the arms sales proposed by the United
States,  demonstrate  how  weak  is  the  spirit  of  defence  which  should  theoretically
underlie Taiwanese nationalism. This shows how narrow is the margin of manœuvre of
the authorities, and consequently of Taiwanese nationalism.
37 It  is  clear  that  the  promulgation  in  March  2005  by  the  Chinese  National  People's
Congress of law against secession from the nation (WWWWWW, fan fanlie guojia fa)
which reiterates the threat of a resort to force (Article 8) has once again nourished
Taiwanese  nationalism,  producing  ipso  facto  a  five  point  rise  in  support  for
independence56. However this movement will probably remain in a minority. What this
new law has mainly favoured is the strengthening of the Taiwanese consensus against
China's  persistent  refusal  to  recognise  the  division  of  the  Chinese  nation  into  two
separate states, and the survival of the Republic of China, which was founded in 1912 on
part  of  the  national  territory.  The  highly  favourable  reaction  of  Taiwanese  public
opinion to the visits paid to China in the spring of 2005 by the two main opposition
leaders (Lien Chan and James Soong) confirm, if it is necessary, the moderation and the
limits of Taiwanese nationalism. Above and beyond the differences and institutional
stalemates which divide the Green camp from the Blue, the only form of nationalism
shared by all Taiwanese is that based on the determination to defend the status quo
and the maintenance of an ROC outside the PRC, which is to say a politically Taiwanese
nationalism whose relationship with Chinese culture will, however, remain privileged.
38 All  in  all,  for  the  reasons  we  have  mentioned,  Taiwanese  nationalism  is  not  an
“ordinary  nationalism”.  It  will  remain  a  nationalism  which  is  frustrated  by  the
“sinitude” of its cultural and historical inheritance, by the irredentist claims of Chinese
nationalists and by the anti-nationalist “pledges” imposed by the Americans.
Is co-existence between Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism possible?
39 In  these  circumstances,  is  Taiwanese  nationalism  capable  of  rivalling  Chinese
nationalism? More political  than cultural,  based more on a state than on ethnicity,
more modern and even post-modern than traditional, the former does not possess the
absolute, touchy and occasionally racist character of the latter. While the nativist and
fundamentalist perversions of Taiwanese nationalism appear in some ways as reversed
images of the most conservative and imperial tendencies in Chinese nationalism, they
have little likelihood of being embraced by the majority, and of becoming consensual,
so complex, globalised, plural—and Chinese—is Taiwanese reality.
40 Nonetheless,  both  internally  and  on  the  international  scene,  Taiwan  needs  its
nationalism for it is this new feeling alone which today is capable of maintaining the
“sovereignist” and “civic” consensus on which, initially by default and more recently as
a plan, is based the existence of the Republic of China in Taiwan. Here one cannot avoid
the  temptation  of  establishing  a  parallel  between  the  current  construction  of
Taiwanese nationalism and the identical process favoured by the political leaders of
another  predominantly  Chinese  society,  Singapore.  However,  in  contrast  with  the
government in Singapore, Chen Shui-bian's government is engaged in a race against
time, the objective of which is to consolidate Taiwanese nationalism before the island's
economy  and  society  find  themselves  completely  within  the  orbit  of  the  People's
Republic of China. To some extent, as we have seen, this voluntarism has produced
results. But in order to consolidate this nationalism, it will have to cultivate, not so
much its ambiguity, as its plural character, its belonging both to the Chinese cultural
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world and to a sovereign Taiwanese nation called the Republic of China. It will have to
exclude  its  most  nativist  manifestations  if  it  wants  to  maintain  on  the  island  the
political consensus necessary for the spirit of defence of a state which is not only called
into question, but threatened by a People's Republic of China whose power increases
daily. And lastly, Taiwanese nationalism will have to continue to set itself apart from
the independence movement if it wishes to guarantee its own survival, which is to say
in particular the assurance of American protection, and eventually find grounds for
compromise  with  the  most  moderate  and  democratic  manifestations  of  Chinese
nationalism.  It  is  only  on  this  basis  that  the  “imagined  community”  which  is  the
Taiwanese  nation  will  be  able  to  build  and  prosper.  Otherwise,  it  will  continue  to
fragment and to weaken, and will end up by falling apart.
41 Translated from the French original by Michael Black
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